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Abstract The convergence of biomedical sciences
with nanotechnology as well as ICT has created a new
wave of biomedical technologies, resulting in visions
of a ‘molecular medicine’. Since novel technologies
tend to shift concepts of disease and health, this paper
investigates how the emerging field of molecular
medicine may shift the meaning of ‘disease’ as well
as the boundary between health and disease. It gives a
brief overview of the development towards and the
often very speculative visions of molecular medicine.
Subsequently three views of disease often used in the
philosophy of medicine are briefly discussed: the
ontological or neo-ontological, the physiological and
the normative/holistic concepts of disease. Against
this background two tendencies in the field of
molecular medicine are highlighted: (1) the use of a
cascade model of disease and (2) the notion of disease
as a deviation from an individual pattern of function-
ing. It becomes clear that molecular medicine pulls
conceptualizations of disease and health in several,
partly opposed directions. However, the resulting
tensions may also offer opportunities to steer the
future of medicine in more desirable directions.
Keywords Molecular medicine . Nanomedicine .
Concept of disease . Concept of health . Technology .
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‘… deep molecular familiarity with the human
body, along with simultaneous nanotechnolog-
ical engineering advances, will set the stage for
a shift from today’s molecular scientific medi-
cine in which fundamental discoveries are
constantly being made to a molecular techno-
logic medicine in which the molecular basis of
life, by then well known, is manipulated to
produce specific desired results.’ ([13]: 162)
According to their proponents, converging tech-
nologies will bring about wonders. They are expected
to bring many benefits to all kinds of domains, and
medicine is no exception [34, 35]. It is said that the
convergence of biomedical knowledge with nano-
technology and information and communication tech-
nologies (ICT) will ‘revolutionize’ medical science as
well as health care practice. As the American nano-
medicine pioneer Robert Freitas announces, such
convergence may lead to a form of medicine that
is thoroughly ‘molecular’. It will use knowledge of
molecular bodily functioning as well as nano-sized
instruments (‘molecular machines’) to intervene in
bodily processes at the molecular level.
Freitas’ sketch of the future of medicine is highly
speculative. His expectations reveal the impatience of
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the techno-enthusiast. However, his claim that a
‘molecular medicine’ is emerging, based on the
convergence of different technologies, is certainly
grounded in current visions and techno-scientific
developments. Both the United States and Europe
have recently been developing visions, research
agendas, roadmaps and funding opportunities for
nanomedicine in which ‘molecular medicine’ is a
guiding ideal [10, 11, 27].
Even though, or perhaps particularly because, the
applications are as yet limited, the nature of the visions
involved deserves philosophical attention. What exactly
is envisioned for the future of medicine? Will it simply
offer more effective tools to realize the widely shared
goals of reducing disease/suffering and fostering health?
Or will these goals themselves be transformed during
the process? As pointed out in the introduction to this
special issue, converging technologies tend to shift the
meaning of many basic concepts we use to make sense
of the world: they shift the ‘symbolic order’. This
paper elaborates this claim in relation to converging
technologies in the medical domain. The central
question is: Will current and future developments
towards a molecular medicine shift the meaning of
‘disease’ and ‘health’, and if so, in which direction?
To investigate the conceptualization of disease and
health in molecular medicine I will first present the
visions, expectations of and ongoing developments in
this domain. Subsequently, I will briefly discuss how
technology in general constitutes ‘disease’ and present
three ways of conceptualizing disease that are well
known from the philosophy of medicine: the ontological
or neo-ontological, the physiological and the normative/
holistic concepts of disease. These different conceptu-
alizations will then be used to analyse the way disease is
conceptualized in the visions of molecular medicine. It
will become clear that molecular medicine pulls the
conceptualization of disease and health in several, partly
opposed directions. I will conclude by discussing the
resulting tensions and problems, as well as the oppor-
tunities these seem to offer for steering the future of
medicine in more desirable directions.
Molecular Medicine: An Emerging Domain
Enabled by Converging Technologies
What are we talking about when we speak of
‘molecular medicine’? First, it should be noted that I
use this term as the common denominator for a wide
variety of technological, scientific and social develop-
ments and visions of the future of medical science and
health care, all of which are enabled by converging
technologies. Thus, molecular medicine in my view is
more than a set of technological devices; it is a
complex network of technological, scientific and
social developments that mutually interact with each
other. Moreover, these developments are driven by
common visions of what the practice of medicine
should be all about. However, by using one term, this
paper inevitably makes these developments and
visions seem more homogenous as well as more real
than they actually are. It is important, therefore, to
keep in mind that we are talking about an emerging
set of visions and developments that seem to be
moving in a similar direction, a large part of which is
still speculative in nature.
Secondly, converging technologies in the medical
domain are sometimes also denoted by the terms
‘bionanotechnology’ or ‘nanomedicine’. Bionano-
technology refers to the convergence of life sciences
and nanotechnology and thus includes non-medical
applications (see for example [1]; [20]). It is too
broad for the focus of this paper. Nanomedicine, on
the contrary, seems to capture most of what I will
denote here as molecular medicine. It is already a
commonly known term, used in Europe and the
United States to refer to ‘the application of nano-
technology to health’ ([10]: 6) or to ‘medical inter-
vention at the molecular scale for curing disease or
repairing damaged tissues’ [27]. Although ‘nano-
medicine’ may be the more commonly used term, I
prefer to use ‘molecular medicine’ for three reasons.
To begin with, ‘nanomedicine’ neglects the important
role of ICT in visions of medicine’s future. Without
the creation of huge databases, as well as methods for
the analysis and communication of data, most
applications of nanotechnology for medical purposes
would not be realized at all. Like nanotechnology,
ICT enables biomedical science and practice to
develop in a specific direction. More importantly,
however, by focusing on medical practice rather than
technology, ‘molecular medicine’ allows us to con-
ceive of the emerging developments and visions as
including much more than a new set of devices. These
devices require a specific social organization as well.
Focusing on molecular medicine helps to envision how
molecular tools articulate and reconfigure specific
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forms of medical practice. Finally, ‘molecular medi-
cine’ brings into very clear focus the central idea
guiding these developments: disease and health are
molecular processes and should be dealt with at that
level (for a similar comparison of nanomedicine and
molecular medicine see [25]: 174). In this respect
molecular medicine differs from ‘biomedical nano-
technologies’ more broadly conceived, that use the
characteristic properties of materials at the nanoscale
for medical purposes [44].
That said, how is molecular medicine defined?
Different definitions are circulating, but the recurring
principle of all of them is to identify the molecular
processes related to disease, as well as to design
interventions in these processes that might counter or
even prevent disease. As the journal Molecular
Medicine states on its website:
‘Molecular Medicine strives to understand nor-
mal body functioning and disease pathogenesis at
the molecular level which may allow researchers
and physician-scientists to use that knowledge in
the design of specific molecular tools for disease
diagnosis, treatment, prognosis, and prevention.’
(source: http://www.molmed.org/about.html;
accessed 2 September 2009)
Molecular medicine thus encompasses an approach
in medical research as well as a vision of future medical
practice. Scientific insight into bodily processes at
the molecular level should lead to applications with
medical purposes. As the National Institutes of Health
put it, the first phase is concerned with ‘understanding
nature’s rules of biological design that in turn will
enable researchers to correct defects in unhealthy cells’,
whereas in a second phase ‘the acquired fundamental
knowledge and developed tools will be applied to
understanding and treating disease.’ [27].
Although its proponents promote molecular medi-
cine as a novel and revolutionary enterprise, the idea
that insight into molecular processes is crucial to
understand and counter disease is actually much older.
Physical chemist and Nobel Prize winner Linus Pauling
is said to have coined the term ‘molecular disease’. He
is also credited with the idea of molecular medicine
more generally. In 1949 he and his colleagues published
a paper in Science entitled ‘Sickle Cell Anemia, a
Molecular Disease’ that was commemorated in the
same journal 50 years later, where it was described as
“laying the groundwork for establishing the field of
molecular medicine” ([29]: 543; [42]: 1488).
Pauling’s idea only gained real driving power,
however, when technologies that opened up these
processes for human scrutiny became available. Since
the 1990s, developments in nanotechnology have
made it possible for biomedical scientists to observe
human bodily functioning at the molecular level, for
example, by novel imaging techniques or by lab-on-a-
chip technology. In addition, the specific properties of
nano-sized materials are exploited for monitoring and
manipulating bodily processes. The investigation of
the relationship between particular diseases and the
occurrence of specific molecules (‘biomarkers’) was
further enabled by the development of ICT, providing
tools for the collection, storage and analysis of the huge
amount of data necessary for this type of research.
Biological functioning at the molecular level is con-
ceived of as the continuous exchange of information.
The molecular approach in medicine thus provides a
clear example of the power that can emerge when
biomedical science, nanotechnology and ICTconverge.
Boosted by technological developments, molecular
medicine began to institutionalize. In the 1990s several
countries established research institutes focusing on
this domain and an international journal was also
founded (see www.molmed.org). The first textbook
was published in 1998 [18], with an updated edition
appearing in 2006 [37]. In the first decade of the new
century, several Master’s programmes and private
companies explicitly focusing on molecular medicine
emerged and the concept became visible in govern-
ment and scientific funding programmes in several
countries (for example in the Roadmap of the National
Institutes of Health 2004; in the European Technology
Platform’s Nanotechnology for Health—Vision Paper
and Basis for a Strategic Research Agenda 2005 and
Strategic Agenda on Nanomedicine 2006; and in the
Business Plan of the Dutch Centre for Translational
Molecular Medicine [7].
As indicated above, molecular medicine is both a
field of research and a vision of the future of medical
practice. How then might this type of research change
medical practice? From the current literature, seven
different (often interlocking) aims can be derived:
1. Earlier and more reliable diagnosis
2. Improving prognosis and reducing over and
undertreatment
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3. Improving the effectiveness of drug therapy
4. Exploiting the regenerative capacity of the human
body
5. Less invasive or burdensome medical technologies
6. Monitoring bodily functioning
7. Personalizing health care
In relation to all of these aims, there have been
some successes, while many more applications are in
development. Examples of existing technologies and
those under investigation can be found in Table 1.
Taken separately, the aims summarized above are
not very spectacular as most of them are familiar from
earlier forms of medical research and practice. In the
most far-reaching visions of molecular medicine,
however, the functions of monitoring, early diagnos-
tics, prevention and/or effective therapy are combined
into an all encompassing system of medical care that
is nonetheless claimed to be of little burden to the
patients. Since the envisioned tools of molecular
medicine are expected to be very small, they can be
ubiquitous without the subjects involved noticing. In
the guiding visions of molecular medicine, then, health
care will extend both in time as well as in place.
Firstly, molecular medicine is envisaged to be
active 24 h a day, 7 days a week, and from the cradle
to the grave. It will enable the continuous monitoring
and adjusting of the bodily functioning of individuals:
‘Future applications of nanobiotechnology in-
clude development of in vivo sensors. Nano-
sized devices are envisaged that could be ingested
or injected into the body, where they could act
as reporters of in vivo concentrations of key
analytes. These devices would have a capability
for sensing and transmitting data to an external
data capture system. The constant vigilance of
these devices would provide a real-time, 24/7
scrutiny of the state of a person’s health.’ ([12]:
172–173)
‘Ultimately, it might be envisioned that when an
infant is born, a blood sample will be collected
for the purpose of determining the baby’s
genome. The information will then be used
throughout that person’s life to guide primary
prevention strategies, make diagnoses on a
molecular basis, and individualize drug therapy.’
([19]: 304–305)
Secondly, and closely related, both monitoring and
intervention can take place anywhere. The miniatur-
ization of medical instruments will allow them to
travel beyond the walls of laboratories and hospitals
to the everyday world of home and work:
‘The integration of minimally invasive diagnos-
tics with information technology for remote
monitoring of the patient’s condition may
produce a radical shift of the point of care from
the hospital or clinic to the home.’ ([33], cited in
[9]: 16–17)
Table 1 Goals and examples of current and future applications in molecular medicine
Goal Example of an existing application Examples of applications in development/envisioned
Earlier and more reliable diagnosis Micro arrays for heart disease
([43]: 48)
Molecular machines detecting (and destroying) very
first cancer cells [27]
Improving prognosis and reduction
of over and undertreatment
DNA chips, micro arrays for breast
cancer ([40]: 75–76)
DNA chips for leukaemia, mouth and throat cancer
([14]: 45)
Improving effectiveness of drug
therapies
Polymeric nanocapsules for drug
delivery ([10]: 10)
Drug delivery systems for brain disease,
nanoplatforms, theranostics ([36]: 46–47)
Regeneration of bodily material Twenty types of in vitro engineered
tissue, including skin & cartilage
([24]: 3235)
Langerhans’ islet regenerating therapy for diabetes
([10]: 10)
Minimizing invasiveness and burden
of medical technology
Lab on a chip for monitoring lithium
levels ([14]: 47)
Lab on a chip for colon cancer detection; wet
sensors
Monitoring bodily functioning Implantable chip measuring heart beat,
temperature and blood sugar level
([9]: 16)
Implantable device for continuous measurement of
blood markers ([12, 38]: 172–173; [10]: 10)
Personalizing health care Treatment decisions based on biomarker
tests specifying tumour subtypes
([40]: 75–76)
Molecular passport for life-long use ([19]: 304–305)
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To conclude with one more citation from Freitas:
‘Nanomedicine will involve designing and build-
ing a vast proliferation of incredibly efficacious
molecular devices, including medical nanorobots,
and then deploying these devices in patients to
establish and maintain a continuous state of
human healthiness.’([13]: 162)
Concepts of Disease and Health and the Role
of Technology
In all the talk about molecular medicine, whether it is
about a specific application or about grand visions,
the developments are justified in terms of the value of
health and the reduction of disease. These are widely
shared goals with which it is difficult, though not
impossible, to take issue. However, disease and health
are also very elusive categories of our symbolic order.
These concepts capture a rich set of meanings with
regard to the phenomena of suffering and wellbeing.
The boundary between the two is relevant to the
distribution of many social roles and moral responsi-
bilities, such as who may claim medical treatment,
who is allowed to avoid specific duties and what is
considered responsible behaviour.
Philosophers have spent much time and energy
trying to capture the essence of these concepts and to
determine the boundary between the two. These
endeavours have been frustrated by the awareness that
the meanings of ‘disease’ and ‘health’ tend to evolve in
time. Several forms of behaviour or experiences that
were characterized as diseases at times in the past, such
as female hysteria and homosexuality, are not so today.
In addition, individual cases have been either included
or excluded from disease categories because explana-
tory models of disease have radically changed. This
has raised the question of whether these changes in
meaning are due to evolving phenomena, to changing
knowledge and explanatory models, to technological
developments, or whether they are just the result of
the imprecise use of language.
This is not the place to address these questions in
detail. I will align myself here with those philosophers
who argue that the meaning of ‘disease’ is not some-
thing out there to be discovered with the appropriate
objective methods (see for example [6, 26]). Our view
of disease, as is our view of reality in general, is
thoroughly mediated by the vocabularies and frame-
works used with regard to the human body. These in
turn are deeply influenced by the technologies that
open up the body for investigation. Hofmann [15] has
shown that technology provides the physiological,
biochemical and biomolecular entities that are applied
in defining disease. Moreover, it constitutes the signs,
markers and end points of disease, influences explan-
atory models and establishes how we act towards
disease. As he rightly argues, this amounts to the
conclusion that ‘disease’ is invented technologically
([15]: 18).
Applied to current developments towards a molec-
ular medicine, this means that the technologies
enabled by the convergence of biomedical science
with nanotechnology and ICT are predicated on, and
at the same time reinforce, a particular way of looking
at and dealing with disease. Due to technological and
theoretical changes, the implied concept of disease
may also evolve. Whether such changes can be
discerned and if so, how they should be characterized,
is the central question of this paper.
It may be helpful to distinguish and outline (be it
very schematically) three concepts of disease often
used in the philosophy of medicine as an initial
framework with which to analyse and interpret the
potential changes that molecular medicine might
bring about. I will call them the ontological or neo-
ontological, the physiological and the holistic con-
cepts of disease [8]. As Hofmann shows in his
extensive review of the positions and arguments in
this field [16], the debate is much more complex and
often confusing. It is not my aim to do justice to all
the nuances, let alone to resolve the complexities. I
will confine myself here to delineating three positions
that I think may be helpful in analysing developments
in molecular medicine.
The ontological conception of disease implies that
‘disease’ names entities in the world ([8]: 1076–77;
[41]: 197). According to this view, a disease is an
entity (an ens morbi) that can be identified and
observed. Such an entity can be external (a virus or
bacteria) or internal (a tumour or altered organ). It is
there to be discovered and can be classified according
to its natural kind. This view of disease is very old
and still underlies many lay beliefs concerning disease
as well as some medical-scientific views of disease.
In some cases, the ‘disease’ is equated with its
presumed cause, for example, an altered cell or
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aggregate of cells ([8]: 1076–77). This view was
defended at the end of the nineteenth century in the
mature work of Virchow, and was revived during the
rise of genetics at the end of the twentieth century. In
addition, the tendency to see a gene as the cause of the
disease has sometimes led to the identification of gene
and disease. At the very least a neo-ontological
perspective is discernible in these cases [41].
However, the ontological view is not very preva-
lent in the philosophy of medicine. Its main weakness
is that it has difficulty accommodating the many
changes in our perception of and behaviour towards
disease. This has led most philosophers and many
medical professionals to opt for what is often called
a physiological concept of disease. This view of
disease focuses on abnormal bodily functioning,
where disease is understood as a deviation from
normal functioning ([8]: 1076; [41]: 197). Unlike the
ontological view, it conceives of disease as a process
in time, rather than as a stable bodily state. Moreover,
it explicitly views disease in relation to other normal
bodies, be it the same subject’s body at an earlier time
or the bodies of comparable subjects in a predefined
population. A physiological concept of disease is thus
comparative, but also nominalist and conventional:
what disease is depends on what is considered
normal. This also explains the constitutive role of
science and technology in the definition of disease.
Since science and technology constantly change our
beliefs about what constitutes normal bodily func-
tioning, the relevant points of reference may change
over time.
The physiological view is clearly normative in a
limited sense, since it refers to what is normal and
what is not. However, opinions differ as to whether or
not such a norm can be established in a value-neutral
way ([16]: 223–24; [22]). An influential representa-
tive of the physiological view, Boorse, maintains that
health and disease are neutral descriptions of a state of
affairs [4]. According to Boorse, disease is an
impairment or limitation of the functioning or abilities
that are typical for one’s species. When specifying the
functions that are integral to being human, Boorse
relies on an evolutionary perspective (in particular
survival and reproduction), thus claiming to present a
naturalistic justification of the norms which establish
the boundary between disease and health [4, 5].
Others have argued, however, that the concepts of
disease and health are inherently evaluative. Nordenfelt
argues for a holistic view of disease, in which disease is
an ‘incapacity diminishing an individual’s ability to
reach her vital goals’ [22, 28]. From this perspective,
disease is linked to specific normative views on what
it means to live a good life. These may be shared
within a culture, but Nordenfelt explicitly leaves
open the possibility that these goals vary between
individuals. As a consequence, what is considered
to be disease in case of one individual may not
necessarily be so in case of others.
Concepts of Disease in Molecular Medicine
If molecular medicine is successful in its attempt to
open up and intervene in processes of disease and
health at the molecular level, it is only to be expected
that specific diseases will be redefined and recon-
figured by these developments. ‘Disease’ will be
increasingly connected to the basic biological pro-
cesses occurring in the body. This may lead to
redefinitions, further distinctions of subtypes, as well
as to extensions of specific disease labels. For
example, at present, Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) is
considered to be a singular disease, provisionally
identified by a combination of results on psycho-
metric and biological tests, but definitively estab-
lished only by pathological, post mortem proof of
‘plaques’ in the brain. However, the identification of
molecular biomarkers for AD might very well lead to
a specification of several subtypes of AD linked to
these biomarkers and the disease pathways they
suggest. Moreover, if a biomarker could be identified
in asymptomatic individuals (or in cases of what is
currently called Mild Cognitive Impairment), the label
AD might be applied to a much larger group of
individuals.
Considering the developments towards molecular
medicine presented above, it can be argued that the
redefinitions and reconfigurations they may cause are
likely to take a specific direction. Molecular medicine
stimulates a specific type of thinking about disease. I
will highlight two tendencies in this way of thinking.
The first is related to the search for molecular
biomarkers which predominates in the emerging field
of molecular medicine. This search seems to hinge on
what I will call a cascade model of disease. The
second tendency is linked to the guiding vision of
personalizing health care, for which continuous
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monitoring of bodily functioning is a crucial condi-
tion. Here, disease is conceived of as a ‘deviation
from an individual pattern of functioning’. I will
discuss both tendencies successively.
Cascade Model of Disease
The thought that seems to provide impetus to most
molecular medicine is that by opening up the
molecular level of bodily functioning it will become
possible to reconstruct the disease process itself. This
ambition is both intellectual and practical in character.
Molecular medicine, it is claimed, provides knowl-
edge of and insight into the natural history of disease.
As systems biologist Leroy Hood and colleagues
(involved in the Roadmap Initiative of the National
Institutes of Health) state: ‘The dynamic progression
of disease should… be reflected in temporal change(s)
from the normal state to the various stages of disease-
perturbed networks.’ ([17]: 640). Such knowledge and
insight would, subsequently, provide a truly scientific
basis for timely medical intervention:
‘Given enough measurements, one can presum-
ably identify distinct patterns for each of the
distinct types of a particular cancer, the various
stages in the progression of each disease type,
the partition of the disease into categories
defined by critical therapeutic targets, and the
measurement of how drugs alter the disease
patterns. … In this scenario, molecular diag-
nostics will become an invaluable tool for
molecular therapeutics. ’([17]: 641)
No more trial and error, no more medicine as the
art of healing: in the era of molecular medicine
interventions will be based on knowledge of the most
fundamental level of bodily functioning (for similar
statements see the examples in [23]).
As is clear from Hood’s work, but also from the
research agendas of the National Institutes of Health
and the European Technology Platform on Nano-
medicine, molecular biomarkers are a focal point of
concern in current developments advancing molecular
medicine. Such biomarkers are thought to indicate
specific stages in the process of bodily functioning.
They can be changes in biochemical characteristics (for
example DNA, RNA, protein, peptid) or anatomical
characteristics (for several slightly different definitions
of a biomarker see the [32]: 99–100; [10]: 3; [2]).
Biomarkers are identified by molecular epidemiolog-
ical research (often enabled by huge biobanks) which
looks for relationships between specific molecular
characteristics and the occurrence of disease.
Ideally, biomarkers may be used to reconstruct what
is called the ‘molecular pathway’ or ‘molecular
network’, the series of biochemical reactions in a cell,
which in turn may be the starting point for the
reconstruction of a ‘disease pathway’, that is, the chain
of events leading to symptoms and complaints. Again,
such a pathway is conceived of as a series of inter-
connected biochemical reactions, but now on the level
of tissue, organs and the body as a whole, as well as
within the cell. Both within the cell and the body at
large, each reaction is thought to be dependent on one
or more specific preceding reactions.
The implicit model of disease underlying this
endeavour to reconstruct complete disease processes
is that of a cascade: molecular changes in the cell lead to
changes on the cellular level, transforming the func-
tioning of tissues and organs, and meanwhile causing
symptoms, signs and subjective experiences of non-
wellbeing. In this way, in a series of steps quite small
changes may lead to ever larger changes that in the end
have very serious consequences for someone’s health.
Such a cascademodel of disease conceives of disease as
a process evolving in time as well as gradually
extending in bodily space. It therefore strongly suggests
the need for early intervention, as a freely flowing
cascade is very difficult to stop.
The cascade model is not new to medicine. It has
been the rationale behind many existing forms of
preventive medicine for quite some time, in particular
all forms of screening and attempts at early diagnosis.
Its implicit use in the vision of molecular medicine is
ambiguous, however. In some cases it seems to hint
at a neo-ontological view of disease, but it can also
be interpreted as reflecting a physiological view of
disease. The neo-ontological interpretation is apparent
when the search for biomarkers is equated with the
search for the ultimate causes of disease. As in
genetics, it is tempting to identify a disease with its
presumed cause because this implicitly suggests that it
is possible to eradicate it completely. Such a neo-
ontological view is problematic because it reifies the
disease process and views it as a specific state, thus
neglecting the relevance of subsequent developments
(that may or may not lead to experiences of suffering
or disability).
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The image of a cascade, however, may also accom-
modate a physiological view of disease. It points, after
all, to the dynamic character of disease as a process
extending in space and time. The physiological concept
of disease is also visible in the way the meaning of bio-
markers is established: by population research defining
normal and abnormal functioning. Approaches in
molecular medicine adhering to the physiological view
are not guilty of reification and pay serious attention to
disease dynamics. In practice, however, these dynamics
are conceived of in a limited way: as a linear, automatic
process and as reducible to bodily phenomena.
Viewing disease processes as automatic and linear
neglects the possibility that they may be quite com-
plex, with many interactions, feedback loops and
several end points that may or may not have clinical
significance [31, 39]. The direction of cause and
effect is thought to move in one direction only, from
molecules to cells to tissue to organs, whereas causal
paths may also move in the other direction ([23]:
440–441). However, even if the complexity of bodily
processes is acknowledged (which seems to be the
ambition of systems biology approaches, for exam-
ple), this way of modelling disease usually remains
reductionist. The physiological variant of the cascade
model still tends to reduce disease to a bodily defect,
neglecting the role of the body in personal function-
ing and the relevance of the natural, social and
cultural environment of individuals [21, 23].
Molecular medicine thus seems to hinge on a view of
disease that is ambiguous as well as problematic in
several respects. It might be argued that the problems
observed above result from interpretations of the
cascade metaphor that do not sufficiently acknowledge
its richness. This would lead to a plea for more complex
interpretations, which would make it apparent that a
cascade is the result of the interaction, for example,
between water and the environment. However, it
remains to be seen how far the metaphor can be
stretched. Moreover, the conception of disease as a
cascade has two well-known effects that may, in any
case, not be desirable.
For a start, the cascade model implies that disease
can be asymptomatic, because it starts in a limited space
and only extends later, with symptoms and complaints
usually appearing at a relatively late stage. This means
that individuals who do not experience any complaints
may nonetheless be diagnosed as ‘having a disease’
The cascade model thus further severs the connection
between subjectively experienced illness and objec-
tively discernible disease. As a consequence, human
beings must be considered incapable of monitoring
their own health, as only the appropriate technology can
reveal whether or not a body is diseased. This has led
some to argue that such a view of disease reinforces
paternalistic practices in medicine, since it reduces the
role of the patient ([16]:227). This is true insofar as the
appropriate technologies can only be applied by
professionals. However, even if molecular medicine
offered ample opportunity for self-monitoring, the
potential gap between bodily experience and tech-
nologically mediated data should still be considered.
Closely related to this implication is a second
effect that has already been pointed out: the cascade
model of disease stimulates early diagnosis (or even
the identification of groups at increased risk of
disease) and early intervention (or prevention), since
it suggests that the cascade can only be stopped if it is
still in its early stages. If a full-blown disease has
developed, it will be much more difficult to counter
and drastic interventions may be required. As long as
the disease models do not sufficiently acknowledge
the complexity of disease processes, however, it
seems probable that molecular diagnostics will not
detect disease, but predict the future development of
bodily processes. Only some of the individuals
diagnosed with a specific biomarker will exhibit the
expected disease process and end up with clinical
symptoms and complaints. This means that bio-
markers will function as predictors of increased risk.
Whether they are more accurate than traditional risk
estimates based on genetic, lifestyle or personal
characteristics is a question that will have to be
answered on a case-by-case basis.
In any case, the probabilistic character of bio-
markers will give rise to the question of how to
interpret the uncertainty involved when dealing with
individuals. When is it justified to act on the basis of
biomarker diagnosis rather than waiting to see how
bodily processes develop? And who is to decide?
Although these issues are already well known in the
domain of predictive genetic diagnostics, no easy
answers are available.
Disease as Deviation from an Individual Pattern
The second transformation in thinking about disease
that molecular medicine may produce is not related to
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the substance of what is being measured by molecular
diagnostic tools, but to the procedures used in
measurement. As indicated above, in the vision of a
truly molecular medicine, both the timing and the
location of medical activity change considerably. If
the diagnostic tools become ever smaller and less
invasive or burdensome, it becomes easier to increase
the frequency of measurements. Moreover, the tools
to be used may no longer be tied to a specific location,
such as the hospital or the lab. Thus, the continuous
and ubiquitous monitoring of bodily functioning
seems to become a serious possibility. Let me quote
systems biologist Leroy Hood once more, who
believes that molecular changes in diseased tissue
may be expressed in the pattern of proteins in the
blood:
‘New technologies will generate a hand held
device that will be able to analyze a fraction of
droplet of blood for 1,000 or more proteins and
these will be a window into health and disease.
This will be done twice a year. The information
will be fed into a cell phone and then to a server,
and then it will be analyzed and the patient and
their physician will get an e-mail that says, “You
are fine; do this again in six months.” Or, “You
should see your oncologist.”’ (Hood cited in
[23], 436)
This vision is clearly inspired by the cascade
model of disease, since it urges early diagnosis.
However, the concept of disease here is definitely
physiological. The outcomes of the biannual mea-
surement of a set of biomarkers are to be compared to
an existing set of data, defining the boundaries of
what is to be considered ‘normal’, that is, healthy.
Disease is seen here as a deviation from a pattern. But
what pattern exactly? Whose functioning should
guide the interpretation of results? Currently, normal
values are usually defined on the basis of population
means. In the era of molecular medicine, however,
much more data about individual body functioning
will be available, so that individual patterns may
become much more important as a point of reference.
This could result in a radical individualization of the
boundary between health and disease. What is
considered abnormal in one individual can be quite
normal for another.
The ideal of personalized medicine that is often
associated with the vision of and promises made on
behalf of molecular medicine, ultimately implies a
much more radical shift in thinking about health and
disease than is usually acknowledged. Up to now
‘personalized medicine’ has most often been under-
stood as a goal pertaining to the choice of therapy.
The guiding thought then is that therapy should be
tailored to the specific situation of the patient. In the
era of molecular medicine this is usually interpreted in
a reductionist way, meaning that therapy should be
geared towards the biological characteristics of the
disease. In practice, this goal is pursued by the
identification of ever more subpopulations ([17]; for
a similar argument in the context of nutrigenomics see
[30]). Molecular biomarkers are thus an important
tool for the improved stratification of patient groups.
The hope is that these biomarkers will also provide
clues for the development of therapies fitting those
subpopulations, and thus reduce both under and
overtreatment as everybody would receive the treat-
ment to which they are expected to have the best
response.
If the visions of molecular medicine were pursued to
their radical end, however, personalization would mean
much more than improved stratification. Personaliza-
tion then becomes individualization: acknowledging
the complexity of the individual case. If the ubiquitous
and permanent monitoring of one’s bodily functioning
became possible, the resulting data might radically
individualize both the definition of health and disease,
as well as the boundary between the two. The
physiological concept of disease might then be com-
bined with or even give way to a holistic conception of
disease, in which the goals and experiences of the
subject would play a major role in the definition of
health as well as disease. Personalization thus con-
ceived is not just a means to realize the goal of medicine
(restoring health or, more modestly, combating dis-
ease), rather it affects the goal itself [3].
One might wonder whether this radical implication
departs too much from the scientific aspirations of
modern medicine to be plausible, let alone desirable. It
is true that medical practice exclusively based on
knowledge of n=1 would have trouble in claiming to
be ‘scientific’. However, if one perceives the individual
as situated at the potentially unique intersection of
different stratifications, population research might still
be relevant for the characterization of the individual
case. An individual’s bodily patterns would then be
interpreted against the background of this population-
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based knowledge. Such an endeavour implies a
daunting task, both for medical science as well as the
organization of health care.
Let me finish this section with four observations
regarding what a radically individualized medical
practice might entail. Firstly, it is ironic that the
vision of molecular medicine as ‘truly scientific’
ultimately reminds us that we cannot do away with
clinical judgment when it comes to dealing with
individual cases. After all, a complex and daunting
task of combining and weighing different types of
evidence seems to await us. The more sophisticated
and extensive the collection of data about bodily
functioning becomes, the less easy it will be to draw
conclusions about individuals. Any dream about the
automation of medical judgment seems to evaporate
when we realize that the interpretation of individual
patterns still needs the input of the subject at hand.
Secondly, the radical individualization of medical
diagnosis offers opportunities to reinforce the role of
the subject (patient would not be the correct term
here). As indicated above, the ‘objective’ data
produced by the devices of molecular medicine must
be connected to subjective experiences of the indi-
vidual at hand to make any sense at all. Thus, it may
not only become clear that individual bodies show a
wide variety in functioning, but also that the
relationship between bodily functioning and subjec-
tive wellbeing is less straightforward than is often
supposed in medical science. However, if this is the
case, it makes sense to leave ample room for
subjective considerations about what does and what
does not invalidate one’s capacity to live a good life.
Thus, establishing the boundary between health and
disease becomes explicitly normative, or even holistic
in Nordenfelt’s sense.
Thirdly, increasing the role of the subject in medical
practice is likely to make this practice more experi-
mental. If an individual’s situation is unique and cannot
easily be compared with that of others, it is much more
difficult to give guidance on when and how to
intervene. Subjects will increasingly have to serve as
their own guinea pigs through a lack of sufficiently
representative preceding cases. This observation might
be countered by arguing that such a lack of comparable
cases has actually always hampered medical practice.
The available evidence is much more crude than is
usually acknowledged and does not suffice as a basis
from which to advise individuals. Whether or not one is
willing to grant this, it is clear that developments
towards a molecular medicine not only urge us to
reconsider the concepts of health and disease, but also
the much used concepts of experimental research and
regular care.
Finally, the development of a highly individualized
medical practice will very likely raise complex issues
with regard to the distribution of medical resources.
What will be the conditions to qualify for medical
care and who is to decide? If the definition of
‘disease’ is radically personalized, this presumably
will have consequences for decision making about
medical intervention as well. However, public resour-
ces for health care are limited, so choices will be
necessary. As a result, the boundary between the
medical domain and the domain of wellness may
become fuzzier. Part of molecular medicine would
then be developed for the market of the ‘worried
well’. One might even argue that it is much more
important to ensure that all humans have access to
basic health care and that molecular medicine is
unjust if it deflects attention and funding from global
public health needs. These are obviously important
issues, which I cannot discuss in detail here, but
which urgently call for attention1.
Conclusion: Tensions and Opportunities
in Molecular Medicine
The convergence of biomedical science with nano-
technology and ICT has led to an emerging molecular
medicine. My analysis of the developments as well
as the visions of the future circulating in this field
shows that molecular medicine does indeed shift our
symbolic order, at least as far as the concepts of
health and disease are concerned. The direction of
these shifts is, however, not unequivocally clear.
Molecular medicine seems to pull our views on what
health and disease are in different, partially contra-
dictory directions. This may seem undesirable from a
philosophical point of view if the focus is on
conceptual clarity and coherence. However, it is not
my aim here to propose a conceptually coherent
1 This topic is actually dealt with in the draft Report from the
Roundtable on Ethical and Social Aspects of Nanomedicine
(Thorsten Kohl & Alfred Nordmann, rapporteurs, 2009),
prepared in the context of the Nanomed Roundtable (http://
www.nanomedroundtable.org/).
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alternative. Nor do I have the time and space to
systematically discuss the social and ethical impact of
the shifts observed. I will briefly point to some
undesirable effects of these shifts and conclude by
pointing out how the existence of different views
might precisely help to counter such effects.
As far as the cascade model of disease is concerned,
I have shown that this model can be interpreted in a
neo-ontological or in a physiological vein. The neo-
ontological approach is often problematic because it
leads to a reification of supposed disease causes. The
developmental, dynamic character of bodily processes,
as well as their interaction with the environment, is all
too readily neglected. This effect may be partly
countered by keeping in mind the potentially rich
connotations of the cascade metaphor when interpreted
in a physiological vein, because this view does
acknowledge the dimension of time in disease.
However, as discussed above, the physiological
understanding of disease in molecular medicine is
often severely limited. It tends to work with a simple,
linear model of disease causation and a biological-
reductionist view of disease, in which the environ-
ment of the body receives very little attention. The
first limitation might be countered by systems biology
approaches within molecular medicine, which claim
to leave the linear model behind and construct
complex and elaborate network models of disease
(for an example see [17]). However, Khushf [23])
notes that even within systems biology most attention
is paid to the upward processes (from molecule to cell
to tissue to organ, etc.). Interactions in the other
direction, in particular with those levels in the systems
hierarchy exceeding the individual, are rarely inves-
tigated. As Kushf argues, one might urge researchers
in molecular medicine to take the implications of the
systems metaphor more seriously.
The cascade model of disease, whether interpreted
in a neo-ontological, physiological or systems biolog-
ical way, generally supports an ‘objectivist’ approach
to disease and health. Since disease is concealed
within the body for a long time, with subjects only
becoming aware of it quite late, devices and often
professionals are necessary to determine whether
someone is or is not diseased. Thus, a gap between
subjective experience and objective measurement is
created. Moreover, the proposed interventions are
most often biochemical in nature. This model tends
to reduce the role and influence of subjects and a
large part of molecular medicine also displays this
effect.
This undesirable effect might be countered, however,
by molecular medicine’s tendency towards more intense
monitoring, implying that disease is as a deviation from
individual patterns. If molecular medicine takes the
ideal of personalization seriously and goes beyond
stratification to individualization, this may offer novel
opportunities for strengthening the subject’s position in
medical practice. Both subjective bodily experiences as
well as individual views of the good life could become
relevant considerations in future medical practice. If
such developments are deemed desirable, it makes sense
to reinforce those developments within molecular medi-
cine that strengthen the role of subjective experience
and individual views of the good life.
Of course, actively furthering the desirable develop-
ment of molecular medicine is not easy. An elaborate
sociological analysis of the forces that currently frame
the emerging domain of molecular medicine would be
needed to clarify whether and how attempts at steering
the developments would be feasible. For the moment,
let it suffice to say that the conceptual tensions within
molecular medicine suggest that developments are not
predetermined. On the contrary, I hope to have shown
that we can take them as opportunities to steer the future
of medicine in a more desirable direction.
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